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I. –  Introduction
Never before in human history have so many food consumers and so many food pro-
ducers transacted with one other through the agency of so few middlemen. Consider 
the following figures : A 2008 report by the World Bank estimated that of the 2.5 bil-
lion people around the world who farmed for a living, 1 coffee growers numbered 
about 25 million. Consumers of coffee numbered around 500 million. However, just 
four firms controlled 45 % of the entire global coffee roasting industry, and the same 
number of firms ran 40 % of all international coffee trading. 2 The report also stated 
that the market shares of the top four firms were 40 % in international trading in 
cocoa, 51 % in cocoa grinding, and 50 % in confectionary manufacturing. 3 Moreover, 
just three companies controlled over 80 % of the world’s tea markets.
Apart from heavy concentration in the food processing segment of agricultural sup-
ply chains, we have also witnessed increasing consolidation among retail supermar-
kets. The German as well as the Austrian markets show a very high level of concentra-
tion. In Germany, the four biggest retailers hold around 85 % of the market 4
1 World Bank, “World Development Report 2008 : Agriculture for Development”, (November 2007), 
3, and 29. See also Sophia Tickell, Fairtrade in perspective, (2004) Sustainability Radar ; op. cit. Liz 
Dodd & Samuel Asfaha, Rebalancing the Supply Chain : buyer power, commodities, and competition 
policy, South Centre & Traidcraft, (April 2008), 9.
2 World Development Report 2008, 135-136.
3 Id.
4 Bundeskartellamt-Lebensmitteleinzelhandel, “Pressmeldung: Bundeskartellamt untersucht Beschaf-
fungsmärkte im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel”, http ://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/down-
load/pdf/Presse/2011/2011-02-14_PM_SU_ LEH__Final.pdf, 14th February 2011.
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(compared to eight holding 70 % in 1999 5) while in Austria the three biggest retailers 
hold around 83 %. This phenomenon, which used to be more commonly associated 
with European markets, has spread all over the world. A proposed merger between 
Wal-Mart, the giant US retail conglomerate and Massmart, a South African wholesal-
er and retailer of groceries, liqour and general merchandise has hit a barrier, having 
been approved only subject to conditions by the Competition Tribunal of South Afri-
ca, and foundered against procedural issues in Namibia. 6
Staying in Europe however, there have been several investigations of supermarkets by 
competition regulatory bodies in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria in 
recent years. In addition, a majority of the members of the European Parliament 
adopted a declaration in 2008 requesting the European Commission to address “the 
abuse of power by large supermarkets operating in the European Union.” 7 In February 
2011, the German Bundeskartellamt (BKA) announced the start of an in-depth sector 
inquiry into the retail sector. 8 According to the President of the BKA, Andreas Mundt, 
the inquiry aimed at throwing light on the power balance or imbalance between retail-
ers and producers, and it would focus on answering specific questions such as what the 
market position of certain retailers (including their partners) is with regard to certain 
product groups. The BKA would begin by investigating the extent to which certain 
retailers benefit from their buying conditions compared to competitors. The next step 
will be to analyse the consequences of such benefits for the downstream market. 9 Two 
mergers in the retail sector, EDEKA/Plus 10 and EDEKA/Trinkgut, 11 were cleared by 
the BKA subject to conditions. In 2008, the Austrian Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde 
(BWB) conducted an inquiry into the retail sector which looked at buyer power with 
5 Vanessa VON SCHLIPPENBACH and Ferdinand PAVEL, “Konzentration im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel : 
Hersteller sitzen am kürzeren Hebel”, Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin Nr. 13/2011, 1.
6 See respectively, Walmart Stores Inc / Massmart holdings, Case No: 73/LM/Dec10 (29 June 2011) 
(Competition Tribunal of South Africa); Namibian Competition Commission and Another v. Wal-Mart Stores 
Incorporated (SA 41/2011) [2011] NASC 11 (4 November 2011) (Supreme Court of Namibia); South 
Africa: Appeal Against Wal-Mart and Massmart Merger in South Africa, AllAfrica.com, October 
20th, 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201110201426.html (last accessed February 1st, 2012).
7 Declaration tabled by Caroline Lucas (Verts/ALE/UK), Gyula Hegyi (PSE/HU), Janusz Wojcie-
chowski (UEN/PL), Harlem Désir (PSE/FR) and Hélène Flautre (Verts/ALE/FR) pursuant to Rule 
116 of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, EP reference number : DCL-0088/2007 / P6-
TA-PROV(2008)0054.
8 See supra note 4, at 1.
9 Id., at 2.
10 Bundeskartellamt 2. Beschlussabteilung B 2 – 333/07 ; http ://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeut-
sch/download/pdf/Fusion/Fusion08/B2-333-07_Internet.pdf. 
11 Bundeskartellamt 2. Beschlussabteilung B 2 – 47250 – Fa –52/10 ; http ://www.bundeskar-
tellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/Fusion/Fusion10/B02-052-10.pdf.
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regard to specific product groups, such as dairy products, beer and others. 12 The 
inquiry confirmed the existence of buyer power, varying to a certain extent depending 
on the product group. It also showed that the conditions foreseen in the contracts dif-
fered widely and were often neither transparent nor clear cut, for the most part com-
ing down to conditions having an effect on the price. 13 In March 2011, a merger 
between two wholesalers was cleared by the BWB only subject to extensive condi-
tions. 14 The relevant geographic market was defined at 30 km from each business loca-
tion for the market without delivery and 100 km for the delivery market.
The animating principle behind most contemporary competition regimes including 
those 15 of the European Union, is for the most part, 16 the protection of the interests 
of end consumers. The most unequivocal affirmation of this intellectual foundation 
was articulated by Joaquín Almunia, the European Commissioner for Competition 
Policy, in a speech given in Poznan in November 2011 :
“Consumer welfare is not just a catchy phrase. It is the cornerstone, the guiding principle of EU 
competition policy. In all our cases we start by looking at the likelihood of ‘harm’ to consumers. 
What we want to know is to what extent the merger, agreement or practice in question can reduce 
choice, increase prices or stifle innovation….Understandably, not all our cases deal with consum-
er products. We often look at intermediate markets – involving raw materials or essential inputs – 
where the ‘consumers’ are corporate customers seeking competitive conditions of supply. I would 
like to make one point clear here : the role of competition authorities is not to deliver these bene-
fits directly to consumers, but to create the best conditions for a well-functioning market. The 
Commission, together with National Competition Authorities, do this by ensuring that companies 
compete rather than collude ; that market power is not abused or acquired through anticompetitive 
mergers ; and that – when efficiencies are claimed – they are passed onto customers.” 17 (internal 
paragraphs removed)
12 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, Allgemeine Untersuchung des österreichen Lebensmitteleinzelhandels 
unter besonderer berücksichtigung des Aspekts der Nachfragemarkt, http ://www.bwb.gv.at/Untersu-
chungen/Lebensmittelhandel/Documents/Lebensmittelhandel %20Endbericht.pdf, June 2007, 6-7.
13 Id., at 20-21.
14 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, “Marktabgrenzung im Bereich LGH” ; http ://www.bwb.gv.at/Fachinfor-
mationen/Standpunkte/Seiten/MarktabgrenzungimBereichLGH.aspx, last visited February 1st 2012.
15 The use of the plural is intended to take account of the national competition regimes.
16 Of late, there have been a number of departures from this general disposition. These shall be 
considered briefly in the final Section IV to this note.
17 SPEECH/11/803, What’s in it for Consumers ? European Competition and Consumer Day Poznan November 
2011 (November 24, 2011) available at http ://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do ?reference 
=SPEECH/11/803&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. (last accessed 
November 28th, 2011) See also UK Competition Commission, describing competition as “a 
process of rivalry between firms… seeking to win customers’ business over time.” (Merger 
References : Competition Commission Guidelines (June 2003, CC 2), § 1.20 ; and Market Inves-
tigation References : Competition Commission Guidelines (June 2003, CC 2), § 1.16) ; U.S.
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CONSUMER LAW – REVUE EUROPÉENNE DE DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION
96  2012/1
In this article, we shall adopt the consumer welfare-based conception of competi-
tion law, as opposed to the ordoliberal philosophies that prevailed in the US until the 
Reagan administration 18 or those regimes aimed at repairing social inequality. 19 The 
first order of business will be to survey the economic theory behind monopsony, to 
demonstrate its harms to consumer welfare. We shall also consider the effects of 
monopsony particular to food and agricultural markets. Second, we shall explore if 
there is anything at all that competition law can do about these effects, and if so, 
whether European competition regimes exploit all the regulatory tools available to 
them. Thirdly and finally, we shall take a look the consumerist conception of compe-
tition law to see how much it captures of the broad range of interests consumers actu-
ally possess.
II. –  Consumer harms arising from buyer power
in food supply chains
A. –  MONOPSONY IN THEORY
EU competition law has, until relatively recently, generally tended to view monop-
sony as a benign, pro-competitive force, or, at the very least, a matter of little or no 
competitive concern. According to this general scheme, the downward pressure the 
dominant buyer exerts upon producers forces the less efficient among them to merge, 
achieve economies of scale, cut costs, or exit the market, leaving the more efficient 
ones behind. Such buyer power, it is argued, is especially beneficial if it provides a 
18 In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), the US Supreme Court held that the goals 
of Antitrust law were “to yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the 
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment 
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.”
19 See South African Competition Act 1998, section 2 of which aims to “promote and maintain 
competition in the Republic in order… (e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have 
an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy ; and (f) to promote a greater spread of 
ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons”. 
Moreover, section 12A(3) of the Act on merger control requires consideration by the Competition 
Commission or Tribunal of whether the proposed merger has an effect on “the ability of small 
businesses or firms controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons to come competitive.” 
Ch. 4, part B of the Act allows the Competition Tribunal to exempt for up to five years otherwise 
anticompetitive agreements if they, inter alia, promote “the ability of small businesses and or firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons…” The “historically disadvantaged” are 
those who were “disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race” before the coming into 
force of the post-apartheid Interim Constitution of 1993.
7th Circuit in University Life Insurance Co. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1983) defining 
competition as “a state in which consumer interests are well-served rather than as a process of rivalry 
that is diminished by the elimination of even one tiny rival.”
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countervailing force against powerful dominant sellers. 20 These arguments implicitly 
assume that there will be savings, and that they will somehow be passed on to end 
consumers.
The traditional, relaxed attitude of EU competition law towards monopsony is dem-
onstrated by the relative absence of case-law on buyer power, at least as compared to 
the US, where concentrated buyer power featured prominently among the major con-
cerns of the legislators who promoted the Sherman Act, 21 and where it is still litigated 
regularly before the courts. Although the Commission has dealt with monopsony 
issues on a number of occasions in its capacity as the merger regulatory, 22 the Europe-
an Courts have broached the subject only very occasionally, such as in Kesko v Commis-
sion, 23 where the General Court (ex Court of First Instance) dealt with procedural and 
jurisdictional questions rather than substantive issues of monopsony. The closest one 
can find to a mention of buyer power of the non-countervailing variety in the jurispru-
dence of the Court of Justice (ECJ) is the following comment made in passing by 
Advocate-General Maduro in Fenin :
“…the existence of a monopsony does not pose a serious threat to competition since it does not 
necessarily have any effect on the downstream market. Furthermore, an undertaking in a monop-
sonistic position has no interest in bringing such pressure to bear on its suppliers that they become 
obliged to leave the upstream market.” 24
This passage deserves close reading. The first assumption is that monopsonies do not 
necessarily have any effect upon end consumers where they already exist, as opposed to 
when they are in the process of coming into being through merger or other combina-
20 Case T-342/99, Airtours v Commission [2006] ECR II-2585, § 277 (General Court), Case 322/81, 
Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, § 73 ; Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar v Commission [1999] ECR II-
2969, § 114 ; Opinion of Advocate-General Mischo, Case C-163/99, Portugal v Commission [2001] 
ECR I-2618, § 106. 
21 See 21 Congressional Record 2461 (1890), statement of Senator John Sherman : “These trusts and 
combinations ... operate as a double-edged sword. They increase beyond reason the cost of 
necessaries of life and business, and they decrease the cost of raw material, the farm products of the 
country. They regulate prices at will, depress the price of what they buy and increase the price of what 
they sell.” Id. 2457, statement of Representative Taylor : (speaking of “trusts”) “… this monster robs 
the farmer on the one hand and the consumer on the other.”
22 See Commission decisions in the mergers of Kesko/Tuko (November 1996) [Commission prohibits 
merger of two large Finnish chains on the grounds that they would be able to reduce input prices “to 
an extent that no rival could match”, thus precluding new market entry] ; Blokker/Toys ‘R’ Us (June 
1997) [Commission prevents merger of two Dutch toy retailers because market power over suppliers 
were not complemented by economies of scale in purchasing] ; Rewe/Meinl (Feb 1999) [Merger of 
Austrian food retailers approved with conditions] ; Carrefour/Promodes (June 2001).
23 Case T-22/97, Kesko v Commission (1999).
24 Opinion of Advocate-General Maduro in Case C-205/03 P, Fenin v Commission (2005), § 66.
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tion. The second is that monopsonists are harmless because they are incentivised not to 
exploit their suppliers so excessively that they leave the market.
The central fault with this general characterization of monopsony with the broader 
concept of buyer power is that it conflates situations where there is competition 
between sellers with those where there isn’t. Chen provides perhaps the best descrip-
tion of this dynamic :
“Buyer power is the ability of a buyer to reduce price profitably below a supplier’s normal selling 
price, or more generally the ability to obtain terms of supply more favourable than a supplier’s 
normal terms. The normal selling price, in turn, is defined as the supplier’s profit-maximising 
price in the absence of buyer power. In the case where there is perfect competition among suppliers, 
the normal selling price is the competitive price, and buyer power is monopsony power. On the 
other hand, in the case where competition among suppliers is imperfect, the normal selling price 
is above the competitive price, and the buyer is countervailing power.” 25
Essentially, “countervailing buyer power” differs conceptually from monopsony. The 
former envisages a tug-of-war between a powerful seller on the one hand, and a pow-
erful buyer on the other. It is basically one-on-one bargaining against someone equally 
powerful, where it is assumed the seller will ask for the moon, the buyer will offer 
peanuts, and the resulting deal will meet somewhere sensible in the middle. Monop-
sony on the other hand, envisages a powerful buyer transacting with one or several 
sellers who lack market power. This distinction has important implications for any 
analysis of effects on consumer welfare.
B. –  EFFECTS UPON DOWNSTREAM MARKETS :
THE CONVENTIONAL PICTURE
The standard microeconomic model stipulates that in order to maximise profits, a 
buyer trading in a market will continue to purchase inputs until the cost of buying one 
additional unit of output completely wipes out the increase in revenue it gains from the 
output it produces. In the language of economics, buyers purchase at the point where 
their marginal factor cost (MFC) equates their marginal revenue product (MRP). In a 
competitive purchasing market, where numerous buyers compete with each other for 
the input, any increased price offered by a particular buyer to a particular seller will 
have to be matched with identical increases by all other buyers to all other sellers. 
Thus, from the perspective of a particular buyer, the MFC and supply curves in a per-
fectly competitive purchasing market are identical. Such a market allocates resources 
efficiently, because the amount of input the buyer is willing to purchase, as determined 
25 Zhiqi CHEN, “Defining Buyer Power”, (2008) 53 Antitrust Bull. 241, 247.
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by the point at which his MFC and MRP equalize, is precisely equivalent to the amount 
sellers are willing to supply.
In monopsonistic markets where there is only one buyer, sellers do not have a 
choice. Consider a small, remote town dominated by a single coal mine. 26 In this sce-
nario, if the monopsonistic buyer (M) of labour decides to hire an additional worker, it 
must offer a higher wage, because the supply curve is upward-sloping. However, this 
wage increase must be offered to all other employees. If not, the other employees will 
quit and the employer would have to re-hire them at the higher wage. As such, when M 
hires one more worker, the addition to M’s wage bill includes more than just the higher 
wage demanded by the new employee. In other words, there is a gulf between what the 
sellers are willing to supply and what M is willing to purchase : M’s MFC curve is 
higher than the supply curve. Thus, at the point of profit maximisation, M purchases 
significantly less than what sellers are willing to supply, in the process reducing the 
price that the producers of those inputs obtain. Put another way, M will restrict its 
demand to the point where the cost to it of suppliers dropping out equates to the ben-
efit to it of the price savings from the low prices asked for by the sellers who remain in 
the market. Due to the reduction in the amount of inputs, the output produced by M 
will similarly fall below that of what society as a whole could have produced given the 
resources at its disposal. If this is the case, it means that end users are paying more than 
they would otherwise have done, for the same amount of end product. As such, the 
default position indicated by the standard economic model is that the monopsonist in 
an upstream market necessarily and by default has effects upon downstream markets, 
even if that monopsonist does not wield monopoly power in them.
It is this consideration which disproves the initially plausible notion of the monop-
sonist passing on savings to end consumers. The Court of Appeals for the U.S. 
6th Circuit failed to grasp this in Balmoral Cinema, 27 where it assumed that a collusive 
monopsony among movie theatres bidding for films offered by distributors “may lower 
prices to movie goers at the box office and may serve rather than undermine consumer 
welfare.” 28 The opinion seems to assume that lower input prices always equate to 
lower prices for consumers, and therefore fails to consider whether the lower input 
26 This example, taken from labour markets, is intended to demonstrate in a simplified way the point 
that a monopsonist obtains lower prices by purchasing a lesser quantity than a competitive buyer. 
Readers should bear in mind certain important differences between labour markets and product 
markets. In product markets, producers have the choice to sell their product by themselves or via a 
retail distribution channel. If they rely on retail distribution, the producer may run into a 
concentration of control over available distribution channels, which creates monopsony. Workers on 
the other hand, do not have a choice of distribution channel for an product which they produce ; 
instead, they are an input factor of production.
27 Balmoral Cinema v. Allied Artists Pictures, 885 F.2d 313, (6th Cir. 1989).
28 Id. at 317.
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prices are being obtained by depressing the quantity of inputs purchased, which would 
make the end product scarce and more expensive for end consumers. Of course, if M 
is also dominant in the downstream market, 29 the welfare of end consumers will be 
adversely affected by “double marginalisation” – a second diminution in quantity of the 
end product available, due to the fact that monopoly sellers tend to depress the quanti-
ty of their output in order to maximise their profits. 30
Empirical studies of agricultural markets appear to bear out this theory. Cost savings 
derived from driving down supplier prices tend to be retained by both input processors 
and end retailers. For instance, although farm gate prices for coffee beans fell by 80 % 
between 1997 and 2002, retail prices for coffee dropped only 27 %. At the same time 
in 2001, Starbucks’ and Nestlé’s profits rose by 41 % and 20 % respectively. 31 In the 
retail sector, one explanation offered for this phenomenon is that when prices rise, 
retail consumers tend to shop around in search of a better bargain, thus pressuring 
retailers into raising prices in unison. However, the argument goes, when prices fall, 
they do not shop around quite so much, leading to less pressure to decrease prices all 
at the same time. 32 According to this argument, the cause of price-“stickiness” is not 
market dominance, but the fact that consumers are willing to pay a little more rather 
than trudge wearily from supermarket to supermarket, comparing prices on boxes of 
cornflakes. But this merely begs the question : in a competitive and efficient market, 
which by definition sends accurate price signals to all parties, including consumers, 
such price-stickiness should be negligible. A market is efficient only if it incentivises all 
parties, including end consumers, to act efficiently.
29 A firm can wield monopsony or dominant buyer power in its input markets while having little or no 
seller power in the downstream product market. Consider a milk pasteurising plant. The input – fresh 
milk – is highly perishable, and can be viably transported only over a short range before it becomes 
unsaleable. If there are no other milk processing plants in within this geographical range, that plant 
will wield monopsony power. However, pasteurised milk is much less perishable, and can be 
transported nationally, or even globally. As such, the plant will probably not have any market power 
in its downstream market.
30 R. SEXTON and M. ZHANG, “An Assessment of the impact of Food Industry Market Power on U.S. 
Consumers”, 17 Agribusiness 59 (2001) ; rebutting O. WILLIAMSON, “Economies as an Antitrust 
Defence : the Welfare Trade-Offs”, 50 Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1966). Whereas Williamson argues that 
both total welfare as well as efficiency are enhanced where market power increases, Sexton and Zhang 
show that “only extraordinary increases in efficiency could possibly offset the deadweight welfare loss” 
the occurs when a firm is has power on both buying and selling markets. Op. cit. Peter CARSTENSEN, 
“Buyer Power, Competition Policy and Antitrust : the competitive effects of discrimination among 
suppliers”, (2008) 53 Antitrust Bull. 271, 283, fn. 26.
31 Celine CHARVERIAT, “Bitter Coffee : How the Poor are Paying for the Slump in Coffee Prices”, (May 
16, 2001) Oxfam, 5-6 ; op. cit. Paul ROBERTS, The End of Food : The Coming Crisis in the World Food 
Industry (2008), 159.
32 OECD Policy Roundtable on Competition and Regulation in Agriculture : Monopsony Buying and 
Joint Selling (2004), 8.
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There are however, a number of means by which M can, at least in theory, maintain 
the amount of input purchase at levels normal in competitive markets, and certain fea-
tures of many agricultural markets lend themselves to such methods. The first of these 
is price discrimination, while the second relates to the peculiar price responsiveness of 
certain commodities.
1. –  Price Discrimination
The reason why levels of inputs in monopsonistic upstream markets are reduced is 
because at the price offered by M, some who would otherwise have produced the 
input, decide not to do so. M must therefore obtain its inputs from the remaining sup-
pliers who are willing and able to supply at that low price. If, on the other hand, it was 
possible for M to offer each producer precisely the price he or she were willing to 
accept in order to begin to produce, there would be no reduction at all in the level of 
input from what would obtain in a perfectly competitive market. 33 The process of 
offering producers the exact price at which they are willing to begin to supply can be 
carried out, to varying levels of accuracy, by off-market transactions such as direct con-
tracting, where M deals directly with each supplier or with a group of similarly situat-
ed suppliers. 34 As such, no diminution in immediate end consumer welfare arises as a 
result of M’s monopsony power in its upstream input market.
Firstly, and most obviously, perfect price discrimination, i.e. the perfect congruence 
of M’s offer with the price at which each individual seller is willing to begin to pro-
duce, is unlikely to occur in practice. Secondly, nothing comes for free : the avoidance 
of an immediate reduction in consumer welfare is purchased only at the cost of long-
term consumer harms. By setting the prices of input at precisely the level where sup-
pliers are willing to begin to produce, M appropriates all producer welfare. Thus, the 
producers may have nothing to set aside for such things as research and innovation, or 
even the replacement of deteriorating capital equipment. As such, over time, the qual-
ity of goods enjoyed by end consumers will decline, and suppliers will either exit the 
market or consolidate, while new entrants are discouraged from replacing them for 
want of an incentive to do so. If suppliers react to such buyer power by merging and 
combining among themselves, end consumers can expect their choices to diminish far 
more rapidly.
33 Roger D. BLAIR & Jeffery L. HARRISON, Monopsony in Law and Economics, 83-85 (2010), citing Milton 
Friedman, Price Theory 16 (1976). 
34 CARSTENSEN, supra note 30, 283-284. Carstensen observes the use of “all-or-nothing” clauses in 
various American agricultural markets between buyers and producers, whereby the buyer requires 
the seller to supply his total production.
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Food markets are especially prone to price discrimination due to the perception by 
producers that they gain security and price stability by dealing contractually rather than 
on the open market.
2. –  The Commodity Problem
The tendency of monopsony to reduce the quantities of inputs made available to 
society can be reversed in instances of the “commodity problem” ; i.e. by the tendency 
of the supply of many agricultural commodities to increase in response to a reduction 
in price. This is especially prevalent in markets where suppliers are numerous and have 
considerable “sunk” costs making market exit prohibitively expensive, and where the 
product of each producer cannot easily be differentiated from those of another.
Coffee is perhaps the best example of this phenomenon. The land on which coffee is 
cultivated is generally very hilly and located at high altitudes, making it difficult for 
farmers to grow anything else commercially. Thus, should the price of coffee fall for 
whatever reason, the farmers cannot respond by cultivating other crops. Instead, given 
that they have to eat every day, pay the rent on the land, etc, they will produce even 
more coffee in an attempt to maintain their income in the short-term. This winds up 
causing oversupply and depressing coffee prices further, even below the average cost of 
production. It will continue until the marginal cost of production exceeds the marginal 
revenue thereby obtained – i.e. when the revenue gained by producing one more sack 
of beans is not enough to cover the expense of producing that one extra sack. In 
essence, producer welfare is appropriated again and again in a vicious circle ending 
only when producers “leave the market”, which, in the case of Kenyan coffee farmers, 
means the uprooting of entire villages and their resettlement in urban slums. 35 A 
recent study by ActionAid and the South Centre demonstrated a positive correlation 
between concentration in coffee markets and the ever-decreasing proportion of the 
value of the finished coffee product that reaches farmers. 36
Of course, such systematic attrition of farmers’ incomes breeds a great many evils 
for those farmers and their societies, ranging from food manufacturers dispensing with 
proper environmental precautions in dumping waste materials in order to save costs, 
or poor farmers making their children work on the farm. 37 But how does the com-
35 See e.g. Catherine GRESSER and Sophia TICKELL, Mugged : Poverty in Your Coffee Cup, Oxfam 
International, (Oxford, 2002), 22-23 ; Raj PATEL, Stuffed and Starved, 8-11.
36 Samuel ASFAHA, Commodities dependence and development : some suggestions on how to tackle the commodities 
problems (2008), South Centre & ActionAid.
37 See Olivier DE SCHUTTER, Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains. The Role of Competition 
Law in Tackling the Abuse of Buyer Power (December 1, 2010), available at : http ://www.srfood.org/
images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20101201_briefing-note-03_en.pdf ; New York University
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modity problem, tragic as it is for Kenyan farmers, affect consumers in Europe ? Again, 
it is in the long-term reductions in product choice and quality. It has been reported that 
since the 1990s, the supply of high quality arabica coffee from Kenya has been replaced 
to a significant extent with cheaper but lower quality robusto beans from Vietnam. 
Losses in quality were masked by additional processing by firms further up the supply 
chains, and the addition of cream, artificial flavourings and sugar. 38 Although consum-
ers still get their coffee, their range of choice and quality has been altered. The down-
ward and upward spirals respectively of price and quantity of supply are unsustainable. 
The uprooting of entire villages and resettlement of Kenyan coffee farmers in urban 
slums means the loss of a high quality brand or product for European consumers.
An example of long-term, prospective effects being taken seriously by competition 
authorities and tribunals may be found in the UK Competition Commission’s regula-
tion of certain abusive practices by large supermarket retailers in the 2008 Groceries 
Market Investigation – such practices were held to transfer so much risk and uncertain-
ty to producers that they threatened the abovementioned harms to consumers. 39
Clearly, monopsony necessarily has adverse effects upon consumer welfare – at best, 
they may be postponed. Nonetheless, the second limb of Advocate General Maduro’s 
argument remains – i.e. that M will not squeeze its suppliers too much because it has 
an interest in maintaining viable sources of supply. It is indeed counter-intuitive that a 
commercial actor would conduct its business in a way which drives its suppliers to 
extinction. However, like the notion that monopsonists pass savings on to end consum-
ers, this too may be an illusion.
Firstly, we have reason to think that a firm which gets into particular habits and prac-
tices in dealing with its suppliers over a long period of time will likely find it difficult 
to alter them. In the 2008 Groceries Market Investigation, the UK Competition Com-
mission found that of the 52 practices identified in a similar market investigation car-
ried out in 2000 and accordingly listed in the Supermarkets Code of Practice (SCOP), 
20 of them were still being widely practiced eight years later at the time of the 2008 
investigation. 40 Second, the very fact that fundamental patterns of supply are changed, 
especially by off-market pricing, can work to the temporary benefit of dominant buy-
38 The End of Food, 157-158.
39 UK Competition Commission, Groceries Market Investigation (2008), § 9.5, 157.
40 UK Competition Commission, Groceries Market Investigation (2008), § 9.63, at 169.
Law Students for Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and the Right to Food (2009), 3, available at : 
www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/TNCsandRTF.pdf. Op. cit. Christian PARENTI, “Chocolate’s bit-
tersweet economy : Seven years after the industry agreed to abolish child labor, little progress has 
been made”, Fortune (Feb. 15, 2008) 1. As a result of concentration among buyers in the cocoa market 
in Cote d’Ivoire, agricultural wages were so severely depressed that that there were reports of small-
hold cocoa farmers resorting to child labour.
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ers. A change in the quantity of inputs made available by suppliers may deny competing 
buyers access to those critical outputs. 41 Thirdly, as the Commission acknowledged in 
Rewe/Meinl, dominant buyers possess the ability to dictate to consumers the choice of 
products that come to market, and the success of product innovations may be depend-
ent largely upon their reactions. 42 Instead of conserving sources of supply, dominant 
actors in the middle of food chains may have the option of tweaking demand patterns 
for the end product : recall the replacement of arabica with lower quality, processed, 
sugary robusto-based coffee drinks. In this regard, monopsonists on agricultural mar-
kets arguably fulfill to an extent greater than most other undertakings the classic defi-
nition of “dominance” in Hoffmann-La Roche : they can prevent effective competition on 
the markets they act in because they have the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of their competitors, customers, and ultimately, consumers. 43 Finally, 
it must be said that the events of the past three years have not exactly inspired confi-
dence in the propensity of profit-making corporations to align the short-term interests 
of corporate officers with the long-term interests of the firm. Nothing particularly 
seems to distinguish major agribusinesses in this regard.
III. –  Competition responses
While it is one thing to recognize the consumer welfare harms caused by monop-
sony, it is completely another matter to ask if it is possible to remedy them through 
competition law. A cardinal principle of economic regulation is that the solution must 
not cost more than the problem. The standard response of competition and world anti-
trust regimes to dominant market power is that although mergers and combinations 
resulting in the formation of anti-competitive dominant market power should be pro-
hibited, where it is already in existence, the mere fact of dominance should not give 
rise to antitrust liability – only the “abuse” of such dominance should.
In the following paragraphs, we shall consider those forms of market conduct by 
dominant buyers which can represent, more or less arguably, abuses of dominant posi-
tions.
Abuse 1 : Retrospective adjustments to terms of supply
In retail markets, suppliers make investment decisions based on variable market con-
ditions. All decisions are made by estimating the likely returns and balancing them 
41 BLAIR & HARRISON, Monopsony in Law and Economics, supra note 33, 85.
42 Case No. IV/M.1221, Rewe/Meinl, (1999) Commission Decision, § 74.
43 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche, ECR 461, § § 34-5.
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against the risks involved by that particular course of conduct. Retail buyers on the 
other hand, have strong incentives, given the stressful nature of the sales market, to 
pass risks and unexpected costs onto their suppliers. Such conduct will have the effect 
of capturing excessive supplier welfare, thereby removing seller’s incentive to invest in 
capital equipment and innovation. 44
According to the UK Competition Commission, retrospective adjustments to the 
terms of supply were the primary means by which excessive appropriation of producer 
welfare is facilitated. 45 The retrospective amendment of previously agreed upon sup-
ply terms in favour of retailers invariably shifts risk and adds costs to suppliers. 46 The 
Competition Commission was particularly concerned by the tendency of such practic-
es (including the explicit imposition by contract of excessive risk and costs upon sup-
pliers) to cultivate moral hazard on the part of the retailer, because the retailer has the 
ability to affect the amount of risk, but no incentive to minimize it because it has been 
transferred to the seller. 47 Moreover, these costs lie much more heavily upon suppliers 
than on retailers.
Examples of risks passed to sellers by retailers include losses due to theft or account-
ing error of stock already delivered to the retailer ; 48 the imposition of charges and 
penalties by retailers upon suppliers for customer complaints, without giving those 
suppliers an opportunity to verify whether they were indeed responsible for the fault 
giving rise to the complaint, 49 and compensation obligations upon the seller when 
product sales or profits fall below that anticipated by retailers.
Abuse 2 : Stocking/slotting fees and “Category captainship” agreements
Retailers may increase the price of access to their shelves and thereby transfer wealth 
from sellers to retailers by charging sellers a fee for stocking their products. Moreover, 
in retail markets, the practice of appointing “category captains” goes one step further 
by making such captains in charge of managing their particular category. Managerial 
costs are effectively transferred from retailers to sellers.
More pointedly, this relationship highlights the dynamics of dominance for both 
retailer and seller. The buyer will be interested in appointing a certain seller as a cate-
44 UK Competition Commission, Groceries Market Investigation (2008), § § 9.41 and 9.46 at 164.
45 Of the 52 practices investigated by the Commission, 26 were concerned with “practices that have the 
potential to create uncertainty for suppliers regarding their revenues or costs as a result of the transfer 
of excessive risks or unexpected costs to suppliers”. See UK Competition Commission, Groceries 
Market Investigation (2008), § 9.52, at 166-67.
46 Id. § 9.45 at 165.
47 Id. § 9.47.
48 Id. § 9.48.
49 Id. § 9.49.
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gory captain only if it is capable of generating maximal revenue for it from that catego-
ry, and the category captain must ensure that it makes money for the retailer. On the 
other hand, the seller is interested in being the category captain only if that particular 
retailer has substantial sales. 50 This means that exclusionary incentives exist on both 
sides. The retailer would appreciate any action by the seller that raises prices for its 
competitors, and the seller will appreciate if the retailer reduces its purchases from 
competing sellers. Such a “symbiotic relationship” 51 means that excluded sellers are 
separated from their established customer base and must expend resources in establish-
ing new ones, perhaps in new regions, given that retailers often control particular geo-
graphical regions.
Abuse 3 : Predatory buying
Predatory buying is best understood as the mirror-image of predatory selling by a 
powerful seller. The predatory seller, to summarise, temporarily sells at a sub-optimal 
price or even a loss, undercutting its competitors long enough that they go out of busi-
ness. At this point, it charges a monopoly price, which may more than cover the losses 
sustained during the period of predation. The predatory buyer on the other hand, tem-
porarily raises the price it offers for inputs, thereby choking off access to its competi-
tors in that market. Once those competitors have been killed off, it may be left as the 
only player on both the upstream and the downstream market.
The most well-known consideration of this problem comes from over the Atlantic. 
The U.S. Supreme Court examined such an allegation in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Sim-
mons Hardwood Lumber Co, 52 holding eventually, that in order to win on a claim of pred-
atory bidding, a “plaintiff must prove that the alleged predatory bidding led to below-
cost pricing of the predator’s outputs. That is, the predator’s bidding on the buying side 
must have caused the cost of the relevant output to rise above the revenues generated 
in the sale of those outputs.” 53 As Blair and Harrison note, this ignores the possibility 
that the buyer might be able to generate super-normal profit due to a dominant posi-
tion on the downstream market, as well as the possibility that the buyer may be able to 
offset the high cost of bidding on that input by obtaining competitive prices on other 
inputs. 54
50 CARSTENSEN, supra note 30, 292.
51 Id., 293.
52 127, S. Ct. 1069, 549 U.S. 312, 166 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2007).
53 127 S. Ct., at 1078.
54 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 33, 77.
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In any case, predatory bidding does not appear to be a significant problem on Euro-
pean food markets, and the discussion of it here was meant simply to draw a contrast 
between it, and the next type buyer power abuse market : “waterbedding”.
Abuse 4 : Waterbed effects
The “waterbed” theory imagines a dominant buyer demanding from sellers a dis-
count from the market price that reflects the entire savings made by the seller due to 
economies of scale resulting from the larger order. 55 This effectively means that the 
dominant buyer alone captures the savings or an inequitably large proportion thereof, 
meaning further that the seller cannot share these savings with other buyers. This then 
puts non-dominant buyers at a competitive disadvantage in the downstream market, 
leading to the acquisition by the firm of dominance on both the buying and selling mar-
kets. Waterbedding differs from predatory buying, in that the dominant buyer, instead 
of temporarily offering a high price for its inputs, demands an extremely low price.
It should be noted that the disadvantage borne by smaller buyers need not necessarily 
manifest itself in price increases ; they may come in the form of shortages in supply to 
smaller buyers because of volume purchases by large, dominant ones, or in poorer 
service by sellers to smaller buyers.
According to the Working Paper on the Waterbed Effect (henceforth Working Paper) 
the intuitive explanation for the waterbed effect is as the result of a “virtuous circle” 56
caused by some buyers being larger than others. A refusal by a seller to supply would 
affect a large buyer less than it would affect a small buyer. As such, small buyers are in a 
worse bargaining position than large ones, and are not able to demand the same low 
prices extracted by large buyers. These lower input costs will be passed on to the buy-
er’s own customers in the form of lower prices, thus reinforcing the large buyer’s com-
petitive edge. As large buyers become even larger (i.e. by retailers opening more out-
lets), their bargaining power increases, as does their competitive advantage over small 
buyers. 57 Accordingly, evidence of a waterbed effect would not be simply a difference 
in selling prices between dominant and non-dominant buyers, but a tendency by sellers 
to increase selling prices to non-dominant buyers in response to a discount given to a 
dominant buyer. No competition concern is raised if the seller simply refrains from 
extending the discount to the non-dominant buyers. This pricing strategy would pro-
55 Such a “discount” may be an explicit reduction in price, or it may come in the form of passing on to 
the seller certain costs associated with functions normally carried out by the buyer, i.e. grading of the 
livestock, stocking of shelves, etc.
56 Paul DOBSON, “Exploiting Buyer Power : Lessons from the British Grocery Trade” (2005) 72 Antitrust 
L. J. 532, 554. The circle would presumably be vicious from the perspective of small sellers.
57 UK Competition Commission, Working Paper on Waterbed Effect (2008), 3-4. Note that the 
Working Paper was dealing with such effects in the context of retail markets.
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CONSUMER LAW – REVUE EUROPÉENNE DE DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION
108  2012/1
duce exclusionary effects at no short-term cost to the dominant buyer, because that firm 
will actually be able to acquire its inputs or goods for retail at a cheaper rate thereby. 
Thus there is no concern raised over the likelihood of recoupment of the costs of pursu-
ing the exclusionary strategy, because there are no such incurred costs.
However, the Working Paper of the UK Competition Commission criticised a 
number of assumptions underlying the model. The first was that it presumed that buy-
ers were buying directly from a monopolistic seller without considering the differenc-
es in competition in the upstream market or conducting a formal analysis of the whole-
sale sector. 58 Also criticised was the assumption that supply contracts take the form of 
linear prices rather than more complex arrangements such as lump-sum discount pay-
ments by sellers to buyers. According to the Competition Commission, where dis-
counts take the form of lump sum payments, savings cannot be passed on to end con-
sumers. Instead, the Commission considered that the waterbed effect is likely to occur 
only where the large buyers “extract discounts that affect the unit price paid to suppliers”. 59
The Commission appears to assume that consumer welfare is adversely affected only 
if smaller buyers end up having to charge higher prices to the end consumer. Smaller 
buyers may very well react by lowering prices to end consumers in an attempt to 
undermine the large buyer’s dominant position, thus setting off a price war. Consumer 
welfare may nevertheless be diminished in a number of other ways : 60 for instance, if 
the downstream market is sufficiently concentrated, dominant buyers will face less 
pressure from their competitors, meaning that there will be little incentive for them to 
pass on cost savings to the end consumer. Alternatively, consumer welfare may be 
diminished if such “waterbedding” results in sellers leaving the market or foregoing 
investment in capital replacement and innovation. Consumers may thus be left with 
less choice in products, retail outlets, or lower quality products. 61
The main criticism the Commission had to offer was that the above model failed to 
consider the presence of a large wholesale sector, which could potentially use their 
market power to offset that enjoyed by large retailers. 62 Another serious objection 
highlighted by the Commission was the assumption of fixed switching costs for buyers ; 
it held that this assumption does not appear to obtain in practice. 63 However, Dobson 




61 DOBSON, Exploiting Buyer Power, supra note 56, 556.
62 UK Competition Commission, Working Paper on Waterbed Effect (2008), 11.
63 Id.
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2003 Safeways inquiry, where it found that Tesco’s price advantage over its smaller 
rivals had “widened somewhat” as its market share increased. 64
As a matter of theory, it may be argued that the “waterbedding” theory does not hold 
water ; the only reason why a seller can be forced into increasing prices for its smaller 
buyers in order to fund a discount to its larger buyer is, if the seller is selling to that 
largest buyer at a price below its cost of production. Thus, the waterbed theory invites 
us to believe that food sellers will readily sell the largest portion of their output at a 
loss, to which one must observe that this is hardly rational behaviour, and allegations 
thereof should therefore be viewed sceptically. Rather, it may be said that instances of 
sellers increasing prices to smaller buyers in response to discounts to larger buyers 
occur purely because it is within the power of the seller to do so, rather than because 
the seller is forced to do so.
However, the foregoing argument becomes shaky if one contemplates the existence 
of production traps similar to the commodity problem for food processors and other 
sellers servicing retailers. In the very short term, falling prices may encourage such 
sellers to produce more, in order to maintain a level of income, if there are no alterna-
tive uses for the seller’s machinery and equipment. A cotton gin cannot be turned into 
an oil-press overnight. Given the reality of sunk costs, they will continue to produce, 
at least until the price they obtain falls below the marginal cost of production.
With regard to enforcement, competition law faces a big problem in fashioning 
effective remedies for such abusive pricing practices of individual firms. Firstly, as may 
be gleaned from the above discussion, it may be difficult to distinguish an abusive price 
from a legitimate price extracted by a large buyer on account of its purchasing econo-
mies of scale. One crucial factor should be whether the seller increases costs to small 
buyers in response to discounts given to large buyers. The Working Paper also 
observes that “buyer size reflects buyer power” 65 meaning that measures of market size 
can be an additional guide as to whether or not a measure has the potential to be an 
abusive practice. 66 However, structure measurements like buyer size (market shares) 
alone cannot constitute definitive proof of buyer power. Market delineation by the 
SSNIP-Test infers the relevant market from market conduct, and not vice versa. This 
means that really the only thing one can prove is how big a buyer happens to be. Thus, 
64 UK Competition Commission, Safeways inquiry, at § 6.65. Op. cit. DOBSON, Exploiting Buyer Power, 
supra note 56, 555.
65 UK Competition Commission, Working Paper on Waterbed Effect (2008), 19.
66 Id. The Working Paper concluded that the “material detriment to UK consumers of groceries” was, 
“at this stage”, likely to be very small, in light of the objections to a number of the assumptions 
underlying the waterbed argument. It is to be noted that the Commission did not dismiss the 
argument out of hand, but maintained that it was dependent upon further empirical research, such 
that it would “continue to analyse suppliers’ price data”. At 20.
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more is needed before one can prove whether a seller increased costs to small buyers in 
response to discounts given to large buyers.
Lastly there is the matter of fashioning a remedy. Competition authorities around the 
world are rightfully wary of directly setting sale prices. One possibility would be to 
ensure that there is only one sale price offered by the seller. This is the approach 
favoured by the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act. 67 However, in requiring that sellers do 
not offer different prices for identical goods to different buyers, the Act places the 
burden of compliance upon victims of buyer power abuse. On the other hand, the Act 
does prohibit inducements to seller discrimination, and it is argued that it may be used 
to control buyer power accordingly. 68 But more importantly, the problem with such a 
solution is that it runs the risk of over-regulation – it prohibits legitimate uses of pur-
chasing economies of scale that may benefit both sellers and end consumers.
Off-market contracts reducing market transparency
Off-market contracts are the primary means by which buyers can force their suppli-
ers onto their all-or-nothing curves. Such contracts involve the buyer requiring of the 
seller a minimum total level of output before it will buy anything at all. Whereas the 
increased production levels demanded of the seller means that economies of scale are 
exploited, the benefits derived from it are entirely captured by the buyer. Effectively, 
the buyer obtains a level of supply that would be available only in a competitive market, 
except without paying a competitive price for it. 69
Such arrangements are common in U.S. poultry markets where contracts for poultry-
raising involve an exclusive buyer determining the number of chickens to place with 
each individual farmer. 70 In the context of retail markets, such contracts tend to result 
in the producer/seller transferring the higher marginal costs of its increased production 
to other retailers who do not have buyer power, causing a retail “waterbed” effect. 71
Also important in this regard are confidentiality clauses, which increase the “switch-
ing costs” borne by producers by reducing the amount of transparency in the market. 
They work particularly to the disadvantage of sellers, by leaving them unable to com-
67 Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 (or Anti-Price Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13).
68 CARSTENSEN, supra note 30, 329-330.
69 Id., 283-284.
70 R. I. ROTH, “Redressing Unfairness in the New Agricultural Labor Arrangements : An Overview of 
Litigation Seeking Remedies for Contract Poultry Growers”, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1207 (1995).
71 See generally Paul DOBSON & Roman INDERST, “Differential Buyer Power and the Waterbed Effect : 
Do Strong Buyers Benefit or Harm Consumers ?”, 28 Eur. Competition L. Rev. 393 (2007) ; and Paul 
DOBSON & Roman INDERST, “The Waterbed Effect : Where Buying and Selling Power Come 
Together”, Wisconsin L. Rev. 331 (2008).
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pare the various options available to them. 72 The secrecy also allows buyers to set pric-
es differently for different producers. Increasing transparency in food markets will 
allow sellers to be able to bargain for more value should they come to find out that 
other sellers are obtaining more favourable terms. Moreover, increasing transparency 
in markets allows disfavoured sellers to realise that they are being disfavoured, and 
either adapt so as to remove the feature that leads to the differential treatment, or exit 
the market. Moreover, the proliferation of confidentiality clauses in individual con-
tracts may lead to prices on public markets and commodity exchanges becoming unre-
flective of the actual demand for the particular input.
One argument that may be offered in support of off-market contracting is that such 
clauses are necessary in order to ensure stability of supply. Of course, the facts of spe-
cific cases may differ, but on the whole, one finds this argument quite unconvincing, 
because under closer examination, it is actually an acknowledgement of the abusive 
nature of the conduct. It is essentially an admission that the buyer is shifting the entire 
burden of the risk of e.g. a poor harvest or crop onto the seller. If the buyer wishes to 
ensure the stability of the source of supply, the efficient course of action would be to 
pay a premium to the seller. In this regard, some distinction should be made between 
such contracts, and those that include some level of consideration paid to producers, 
such as cheap credit facilities for purchasing agricultural inputs, in exchange for secu-
rity of supply.
According to Carstensen, such contract clauses do not present much of an enforce-
ment problem for competition law. The remedy may come in the form of a simple 
injunction or a regulation prohibiting buyers from buying other than in set quantities, 
and requiring them to accept tenders from all potential sellers. 73 A caveat must be 
made to this general rule for “contract farming”, where buyers provide other valuable 
consideration to farmers such as access to cheap credit and other inputs. 74 In these 
cases, there is more scope to say that buyers are properly compensating producers.
A. –  THE DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING CONSUMER HARMS ARISING
FROM DOMINANT BUYER CONDUCT
One argument against the use of competition law to address consumer harms arising 
from abuses of monopsony power relies upon the fact that most of the consumer harms 
arising from dominant buyer conduct are uncertain, and manifest only in the long-run. 
This poses the question of how to calibrate competition control in the present, given 
72 CARSTENSEN, supra note 30, at 281.
73 CARSTENSEN, supra note 30, 318.
74 Olivier DE SCHUTTER, “Agribusiness and the Right to Food” Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food to the Human Rights Council, A/13/33, 17, § § 43-45 (22 December 2009).
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that the goal of attaining efficient and competitive markets is undermined by excessive 
regulation, just as much as it is by under-regulation. Consider again the example of the 
Kenyan coffee producers. Suppose a new source of arabica had been developed some-
where else in the interim. If so, consumer welfare would not have been affected in the 
end, meaning that competition control, if imposed, would have been excessive and 
destructive of welfare. Given the profoundly speculative pro futuro nature of the com-
petition harms, one might argue that it is only right for EU and most national compe-
tition laws to require a showing of identifiable and likely harms to consumer welfare, 
i.e. de minimis and appreciability thresholds, before they control conduct complained of 
as an abuse of a dominant position. 75
However, the use of competition controls to prevent the occurrence of presently 
unquantifiable future harms is the very basis of merger regulation.
It may be argued, assuming the existence of credible merger regulation, that it 
should suffice for competition control of abuses of dominance to apply when consumer 
harms arising from buyer power reach some adequate level of “ripeness”. This poses 
the risk that by the time the consumer harms manifest themselves in higher prices and 
reduced choice and/or quality, too many producers may have left the market or con-
solidated in order for remedies to have any corrective effect. It may be far too late to 
do anything. To take the example of the Kenyan coffee farmers, it is reasonably clear 
that the consumer harms of higher prices and reduced availability of high quality arabi-
ca coffee will kick in only after significant numbers of producers have consolidated, or 
left the market altogether (i.e., left their mountain villages and settled in towns). It is, 
at the best of times, difficult in the extreme to undo mergers and would often severely 
harm the businesses involved. Moreover it would be almost impossible to undo the 
impact on the market. For instance, it would be very hard to entice former farmers to 
return to their villages.
A consumer welfare-oriented competition regime should, in light of the above con-
siderations, adopt a preventative approach to abuses of buyer power, and the remedies 
proposed would be prophylactic in nature. An important example of this more 
enriched conception of consumer harm in application may be found in the UK Grocer-
ies Market Investigation (2008), where the UK Competition Commission held that it 
was authorized to find an “Adverse Effect on Competition” (AEC) without having to 
“identify specific harm to the interests of ” consumers. 76
75 Philip MARSDEN, “Microsoft v. Commission – With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility” (Oct. 
2007), Competition Law Insight 3, 4.
76 UK Competition Commission, Groceries Market Investigation (2008) § 7, Appendix 2.2, 2.
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Indeed, there have even been certain rumblings in this direction by the ECJ with 
regard to Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 81 EC) : in the 2009 GlaxoSmithKline case, 77
the Court held that “there is nothing in that provision [Article 101 TFEU] to indicate that 
only those agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages may have an anti-competi-
tive object.” 78 It added also that “it must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like 
other competition rules laid down in the Treaty, [Article 101 TFEU] aims to protect not only 
the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, 
competition as such. Consequently, for finding that an agreement has an anti-competitive object, 
it is not necessary that final consumers be deprived of the advantages of effective competition in 
terms of supply or price.” 79
However, such developments have yet to properly filter into Article 102 TFEU (ex 
Article 82 EC) jurisprudence. Under an abuse of dominant position analysis via Article 
102 TFEU, the difficulty lies in showing a “detrimental effect upon trade” within the EU, 
understood as an adverse effect upon consumers. This difficulty could be avoided by 
bringing the analysis under Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 81 EC). This may be demon-
strated by drawing a parallel with the Sherman Act. Carstensen notes that the advan-
tage of using § 1 of the Sherman Act (prohibiting anticompetitive agreements) is that it 
requires far less of a showing of market power than would be required under § 2 (estab-
lishing the monopolization offence). Moreover, it would allow courts to be able to use 
a Microsoft 80 analytical framework while relying on the smaller threshold of market 
power allowed under § 1 81 (prohibiting combinations). As per the analysis in Micro-
soft, the question of whether such an agreement is anti-competitive or abusive may be 
answered in the affirmative if (1) the plaintiff or competition authority is able to show 
harm to competition (not just competitors) in both theory and fact ; (2) the defendant 
firm is either unable to show that there is a legitimate business justification for its 
conduct ; or (3) the plaintiff is able to show that the reasons put forward by the defend-
ant are mere pretexts, or that the same pro-competitive business reasons could have 
been accomplished by less anti-competitive means. 82
77 Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, and C-519/06 P (6 October 2009). See also 
Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands and others (4 June 2009) § § 38-39 ; and Case C-95/04, British 
Airways v. Commission (15 March 2007).
78 Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, and C-519/06 P, § 63.
79 Id.
80 Microsoft v. U.S., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
81 CARSTENSEN, supra note 30, 322-23. See U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2nd Cir. 2003), where 
the court held that dominant credit card issuers had unreasonably refused to allow participating banks 
to join other credit card networks).
82 Such an “economic approach” to the determination of abuses of dominant positions under Art. 102 
TFEU (ex Art. 82 EC) has not filtered through to all EU institutions. The EAGCP Consultation Paper 
“An Economic Approach to Article 82” (July 2005), questioning the prior practice of holding certain 
activities as per se abusive and disregarding possible pro-competitive effects, is not a binding legal
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Given that most of the kinds of conduct identified as abusive, such as all-or-nothing 
contracts and waterbedding schemes, are generally concluded between buyers and 
their upstream suppliers, the obvious Article 101 TFEU category under which they 
may be addressed is that of vertical agreements. At present, courts are generally reluc-
tant to scrutinise such agreements, because it is breezily assumed that such practices 
are generally welfare-improving. 83 Indeed, many vertical combinations do provide 
pro-competitive benefits such as the avoidance of duplication, the eradication of dou-
ble profit margins and many others. For this reason, EU competition regulators will in 
principle not control such vertical agreements absent a showing that the party benefit-
ing from the restraint possesses market power.
The current Regulation 330/2010 on Vertical Restraints distinguishes itself from the 
now-expired Regulation 2790/99. 84 The expired Regulation established a “safe har-
bour”, or presumption of legality for certain vertical agreements depending on the 
market share of the supplier or buyer and the nature of the vertical restriction, which, 
when interpreted according to the European Commission’s Vertical Restraints Guide-
lines 85 stipulated that the market share of the buyer is considered only if the vertical 
restraint concerned contained an exclusive supply obligation. Moreover, a safe harbour 
was available for buyers with a market share of up to 30 %. The new regulation, which 
came into effect in May 2010, as interpreted by the new Commission Guidelines, 86
provides for the buyer’s market share to be relevant where it “purchases the contract goods 
or services which determine the applicability of the block exemption.” 87 This is a marked 
change even upon draft versions of the new guidelines, which considered the buyer’s 
market share only where it resells the goods or services, or if those goods are inputs 
83 There is an important, if dated, school of thought that argues that vertical restraints should be 
investigated only where the producer wields market power : see e.g. White, “Vertical Restraints in 
Antitrust Law – a Coherent Model”, (1981) 26 Antitrust Bull. 327 ; Easterbrook, “Vertical Agreements 
and the Rule of Reason”, (1984) 53 Antitrust L. J. 135.
84 Commission Regulation 2790/99, OJ [1999] L 336/21, [2000] 4 CMLR 398. Expired 31st May 2010.
85 Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ [2000] C 291/1, [2000] 5 CMLR 1074, 
§ 21.
86 Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Brussels, SEC (2010) 411. Available at http :/
/ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/guidelines_vertical_en.pdf.
87 Id. § 23.
authority, as is the Commission’s discussion paper on the application of Art. 102 TFEU (December 
2005). At present, only the Commission adheres to an economic approach to Art. 102 TFEU ; the 
General Court and the ECJ appear to remain wedded to the legalistic approach. See Case T-340/03 
France Télécom s.a. v. Commission and Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission (General Court), as 
well as Case C-95/04 British Airways v. Commission (ECJ). It is submitted that the economic approach 
is preferable from a purely theoretical point of view. However, proving harm to competition may be 
very difficult, especially if it is as remote and indirect (as may be the case in all-or nothing contracts), 
meaning that in practice, there is the danger of under-regulation if one takes the economic approach.
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into the buyer’s own product. 88 However, the buyer market share threshold for the 
“safe harbour” remains the same at 30 %. Moreover, the draft guidelines set out a de 
minimis market share threshold of 15 % 89, under which the transaction is presumed to 
have no effect on trade within the common market. The adequacy of this becomes 
questionable when one observes that the UK Groceries Market Investigation of 2000 
found that retail grocers with as little as 8 % of the total retail market had substantial 
buyer power over sellers. 90
IV. –  Revisiting consumer welfare
This paper broadly suggests that more often than not, monopsony in food markets 
tends to reduce consumer welfare. However, under certain circumstances, abusive 
practices by monopsony buyers in food markets might be severely detrimental to the 
interests of producers, but have no effect or only a vague and uncertain effect on the 
welfare of consumers. Would competition regulation on the basis of consumer welfare 
protection really be warranted in these outlying instances ?
Lest we forget, the people who produce our food are also food consumers. A survey 
done by the UN Millennium Project in 2005 found that farmers cultivating small 
patches of land (“smallholders”) and landless agricultural workers together made up 
around 70 % of the people suffering from hunger in that year, 91 and there is every 
indication that such widespread hunger and famine is not due to food production being 
unable to catch up with population growth. Rather, this paper believes that the starva-
tion of millions despite there being more than enough food to go around for everyone 
is besides many other factors partly due to dreadful misallocation via unjust and dys-
functional markets. 92
88 Draft Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, § 23.
89 Id. § § 8-11.
90 UK Competition Commission, Groceries Market Investigation (2000), § 2.458. Market definition 
plays an important role in deciding whether the safe harbor applies. Much depends on whether one 
defines the market between producers and retailers or between producers and end consumers. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the block exemption requires competition authorities to define 
the relevant market in Article 101 TFEU cases, even though that article does not clearly impose such 
a requirement.
91 See UN Millennium Project, Halving Hunger : It Can be Done, Summary Version of the Report of the 
Task Force on Hunger, (2005) The Earth Institute, Columbia University, 6.
92 Amartya SEN, Development as Freedom (1999), 160-188. See also Susan GEORGE, How the Other Half 
Dies, London : Penguin (1991), 23 ; Susan MARKS & Andrew CLAPHAM, International Human Rights 
Lexicon (2005), 167. Sen observes that colonial administrators in Bengal during the 1943 famine “were 
so impressed by the fact that there was no significant food output decline… that they failed to anticipate – and 
for some months even refused to recognize – the famine as it hit Bengal with stormy severity.” Development as 
Freedom, 209. Moreover, he notes that that the Bangladesh famine of 1974 occurred at a time period
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CONSUMER LAW – REVUE EUROPÉENNE DE DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION
116  2012/1
Some of the arguments made in the paper certainly have a strained, procrustean feel 
to them. For instance, consider the section of this paper that considers business prac-
tices exploiting the “commodity problem” in coffee-producing regions, potentially 
resulting in widespread poverty, deprivation and misery. The consumer welfare-based 
objection to them was that they inexorably lead to the loss of certain brands and goods 
to European consumers. While this perhaps does not capture the full extent of the 
objection to such conduct, under the consumer welfare-oriented conception, compe-
tition law has a restricted scope of application and addresses only a limited range of 
issues. For instance, Scheelings and Wright argue, admittedly in the context of vertical 
restraints conceived as forms of exclusionary (rather than exploitative) conduct, that 
“antitrust analysis need only be concerned with the welfare of the final consumer. The 
end consumer only cares about the quality, quantity, and price of the final product. 
What transpires upstream in the process of producing the final product is irrelevant to 
the consumer of the final good.” 93
Nonetheless, despite the financial collapses of 2008 and 2011, 94 it appears that a 
significant number of consumers do take into account the circumstances under which 
their food was produced. Fairtrade and other labels for ethical food production have 
proliferated in recent years. It accounted for approximately 1.5 billion USD in 2007, 
and covered an increasingly large number of commodities and mechanisms. 95 Moreo-
ver, between 2006 and 2007, fair trade sales increased by 127 %, and retail volume 
jumped by 72 %. 96 In Europe alone, growth averaged 50 % over the past 6 years prior 
to 2009. 97 Of course, it would be unrealistic and unreasonable to expect such altruis-
tic behaviour from all consumers. This paper does not advocate the establishment of a 
republic of virtue.
What it does suggest, however, is a closer look at consumer entitlements. One might 
consider the obligations arising under the international human right to food when dis-
cussing consumer welfare, set out in Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of
93 Richard SCHEELINGS & Joshua D. WRIGHT, “Sui Generis ? : An Antitrust Analysis of Buyer Power in the 
United States and European Union”, (2006) 39 Akron L. Rev. 207, 212.
94 See e.g. Guardian, Fairtrade’s annual sales defy recession to pass £1bn, (February 27, 2011), available
at : http ://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/feb/28/fairtrade-sales-rise-despite-recession.
95 See, for useful studies, Laura T. RAYNOLDS, Douglas MURRAY, and John WILKINSON (eds), Fair Trade. 
The challenges of transforming globalization, (2007) Routledge, London and New York. 
96 Lorenzo BECCHETTI & Pierluigi CONZO, “Market Access, Organic Farming and Productivity : The 
Determinants of Creation of Economic Value on a Sample of Fair Trade Affiliated Thai Farmers”, 
(2009) CREI Working Paper No. 3/2009, 2.
97 Id. 
of “peak food availability”, food having been available in greater quantities than at any other time 
between the years 1971 and 1976 : id. 165.
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Human Rights (UDHR), 98 and Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 99 The right to food has been interpreted by the 
U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (the institution charged 
with providing official interpretations of the ICESCR) as obliging states to ensure the 
“physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procure-
ment”, 100 such obligation being “inseparable from social justice, requiring the adop-
tion of appropriate economic, environmental and social policies, at both the national and 
international levels, oriented to the eradication of poverty and the fulfilment of all 
human rights for all”. 101 The duty is required to be fulfilled “individually and through 
international assistance and cooperation.” 102 Therefore, although this obligation primarily 
addresses each individual state to take the necessary measures to ensure access to food 
for its citizens, there is also an international component.
In their recent book on monopsony, Blair and Harrison struggle with the question of 
when antitrust intervention is warranted. As they note, the “fact that switching costs 
are a source of monopsony power does not resolve the issue of whether an antitrust 
response is warranted. Instead, it raises one of the more perplexing problems in anti-
trust. Simply put, the question is : When is the perceived market power the type to 
which antitrust laws should respond ?” 103 The duty to protect the international human 
rights of persons affected by the conduct of corporations domiciled in their territory 
can provide an answer, and should be taken into account in this discussion. This is per-
haps especially most true of the EU legal order, which enshrines respect for fundamen-
tal rights as a general principle of EU law.
Certainly, it may be said that Article 6(3) TEU, which is the textual basis for the 
recognition of fundamental rights as a general principle of EU law, mentions only the 
rights in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the common con-
stitutional traditions of the Member States. But the ECJ has long since interpreted this 
provision to mean that in the application of the general principles of EU law, it “takes 
account” those international instruments concerning the protection of human rights 
98 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
99 Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
100 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ. Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 12 : The Right to Adequate Food, § 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12.1999/5 (May. 12, 1999), § 6. General 
comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are non-binding, and therefore 
constitute only “soft” law.
101 Id. § 4. 
102 Art. 2(1), ICESCR. The “fundamental” right to be free from hunger, in contrast, must be vindicated 
immediately : General Comment No. 12, § 6. 
103 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 33, 175.
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which bind all the Member States. 104 In particular, the ICCPR has been taken into 
account in this way on numerous occasions. 105 Every single Member State of the Euro-
pean Union is a party to the ICESCR. As Advocate-General Sharpston has observed :
“The Court has held that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is 
one of the international instruments for the protection of human rights of which it takes account 
in applying the general principles of Community law. It seems to me that the same should hold 
good for the ICESCR which, like the ICCPR, binds each individual Member State.” 106
As a matter of principle, A-G Sharpston’s argument is extremely compelling. Even 
better, it may be useful.
V. –  Conclusion
Food markets fulfill particularly important needs for consumers all over the world. 
Competition authorities therefore need to be especially vigilant in their merger con-
trol to grasp possible negative future developments in their assessment. Long term 
effects need to be taken into account, as short-sighted decisions may have highly nega-
tive consequences. Such ex ante control may be extremely difficult to conduct, but is 
nevertheless necessary in order to ensure that competition remains on markets like 
retail, where a trend towards concentration has become visible. However, even ex post
control under 102 TFEU raises many questions, as not all conduct can easily be placed 
into abuse or non-abuse categories. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this paper will have 
highlighted some burning issues at the centre of food security, but which are also rele-
vant to the daily work of competition authorities and businesses concerned.
104 Case C-540/03 Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-5769, § 37 (finding the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child to be taken into account in application of general principles of Community law).
105 See e.g. Case C-297/88 Orkem v. Commission [1989] ECR 3283 § 31 ; Joined Cases C-297/88 Dzodzi
[1990] ECR I-3763, § 68 ; Case C-249/96 Grant [1998] ECR I-621, § 44.
106 Case C-72/08, Nicolas Bressol and Others and Céline Chaverot and Others v. Gouvernement de la Communauté 
française, Opinion of Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston, § 136.
